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Malpractice Actions Without Expert
Medical Testimony
William P. Gibbons*
F EAR OF MALPRACTICE ACTIONS against them is causing physicians to
"run scared." Some physicians now say that they feel that the
threat of legal action has materially altered the practice of medicine.
Defensively, some medical doctors say that they are ordering additional
X-rays and lab tests, just to have them on record. Others say they are
just plain afraid to try new techniques and diagnostic treatments be-
cause of the specter of a malpractice action. Innovative techniques car-
ry additional risks, and some doctors admit that in some risky situations
they merely do what will keep them out of trouble rather than do
what is best for the patient. Some other, more candid physicians admit
that some doctors are not recording everything in patients' records for
fear that the information some day will be used against them.'
To what extent is the fear of a malpractice action justified? In
1964 the American Medical Association published a survey in which it
revealed that 17.8% of physicians had at least one malpractice claim
made against them during their lifetime.2 This percentage varied
widely in different locations-29. 2 % of the California doctors experi-
enced at least one action while in South Carolina only 7.7% experienced
a malpractice action. Statistically, the article went on to say that the
chances of an action per patient visit is approximately .00037% and
suggested that the risk of medical malpractice action not be exaggerated.
3
The report, however, showed an increase from the previous survey
conducted on the same matter from 1 in 7 doctors experiencing such an
action in 1956 to approximately 1 in 5.6 in 1963. The situation probably
is even worse now.
The number of malpractice cases is not the dangerous thing; it is
the fear (and the consequences of such fear) that present the problem.
One consequence of this fear is the alleged "conspiracy of silence" among
the medical profession, administrators of hospitals, their insurers, and
the defense lawyers (of whom it has been said they "are the chief
* B.S. in B.A., John Carroll University; Third-year student at Cleveland State Uni-
versity College of Law.
1 The American Medical News, April 20, 1970, at 1, col. 1, presented in a two-part
series the medical professions' concern over the problems of professional liability. In
the first part of the series an overview of the problem was presented and the second
part reported on the everyday effects of the practice of medicine and took a closeup
view of the situation in California. Some of the everyday effects are summarized
above.
2 First Results: 1963 Professional Liability Survey, 189 J.A.MA. 858 (1963).
3 Id. at 860.
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harbingers of doom on the subject").4 Consequently, plaintiffs are all
too often plagued by an inability to find a physician willing to give expert
medical testimony on their behalf at trial. Justice Carter, in his dissent
in Huffman v. Lindquist, expressed the problems of the plaintiff in ob-
taining expert medical testimony:
Anyone familiar with cases of this character will know that the
so-called ethical practitioner will not testify on behalf of a plaintiff
regardless of the merits of his case . . . (P)hysicians who are mem-
bers of medical societies flock to the defense of their fellow member
charged with malpractice and the plaintiff is relegated, for his ex-
pert testimony, to the occasional lone wolf or heroic soul, who runs
the risks of ostracism by his fellow practitioner and cancellation
of his public liability insurance policy.5
The reasons for the medical profession's silence focus around their
concern for the effect of malpractice actions on the care which patients
will receive and, more importantly it seems, the impact on the eco-
nomics of their medical practice. In Bernstein v. Alameda-Contra Costa
Medical Association, a California doctor was expelled from his local
medical association because he made disparaging remarks regarding
his predecessor physician in an industrial accident action. He was later
reinstated in the association by the District Court of Appeals of Cali-
fornia.6 In another California case, Agnew v. Parks, the plaintiff was
unsuccessful in obtaining expert medical testimony, and he brought an
action against the Los Angeles Medical Association alleging "a con-
spiracy to obstruct the orderly prosecution of a civil action." 7 The
association was alleged to have threatened certain doctors with expulsion
from the associatio4- and to report them to their insurance carriers caus-
ing cancellation of their malpractice insurance if they were to act as
medical witnesses for the plaintiff. Membership in the local medical
society is often the eligibility requirement for admission to the staff of
local hospitals and in obtaining bed space in such hospitals. It may also
affect the insurance rates of the doctor or determine whether he will
be able to obtain insurance at all.8
4 Markus, Conspiracy of Silence, 14 Clev-Mar. L. Rev. 520 (1965); and see, Shapiro
et al. (eds.), Medical Malpractice (Mich. Inst. Cont. Leg. Ed., 1965; Medical Malprac-
tice: Patient Versus Physician (91st Congr. Subcomm. on Exec. Reorg., Nov. 20,
1969); and short analysis in, 2 Oleck (ed.), Encyc. of Negligence, Sec. 418 (1962).
5 37 Cal. 2d 465, 484, 234 P. 2d 34, 46 (1951) (Carter, J., dissenting).
6 139 Cal. App. 2d 241, 293 P. 2d 862 (1956).
7 172 Cal. App. 2d 756, 343 P. 2d 118 (1959).
8 The American Medical Association: Power, Purpose and Politics in Organized
Medicine, 63 Yale L. J. 937, at 951 (1954).
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The California Situation
"California is the focal point of everything that is troubling the
medical liability field today" 9 according to the American Medical News
report on the state of the problem. Yet the situation is not quite as bad
as many would have you believe. In March, 1970 the California Court
of Appeals found in Bardessono v. Michels, that it was reversible error
to allow a jury to base a negligence finding on the common knowledge of
laymen regarding injections where the injection was into an area crowd-
ed with bone, muscle, and tissue.10 This is an excellent illustration of
the reluctance of doctors to testify, even when they are on the witness
stand." The jury was instructed to "rely on the common knowledge
among laymen that injections in the arm, as well as other parts of
the body, do not ordinarily cause trouble unless unskillfully done, or
there is something wrong with the serum, and you may also rely upon
the testimony of expert witnesses." The court pointed out that there
was no expert testimony at the trial on the standard of care, and further
the trial court should not have instructed the jury that the common
knowledge of laymen was adequate to determine whether the circum-
stances were such that injury does not ordinarily occur but for negli-
gence. In previous California cases, unavailingly relied upon by plaintiff,
the court refused to give instructions on res ipsa loquitur because there
was strong expert testimony that the injury involved would not ordinar-
ily occur in the absence of negligence. 12
The Bardessono case is very similar to LeMere v. Goren13 where
causalgia resulted after an injection by the defendant doctor. There was
medical testimony that such an injury could occur whether there was
negligence or not. Although none of the medical witnesses testified that
it was the type of injury which ordinarily does not occur in the absence
of negligence, the jury could have drawn such an inference based on
the testimony. The court held that it was reversible error not to allow
the conditioned res ipsa instruction to the jury.
The Ohio View
Ohio law on the matter of expert testimony when the doctrine of
common knowledge of laymen is not relevant has been recently articu-
lated in Hundemere v. Sisters of Charity of Cincinnati14, a 1969 case
9 American Medical News, op. cit. supra n. 1, at 8.
1o 6 Cal. App. 3d 24, 85 Cal. Rptr. 595 (1970).
11 Id. at 596-598.
12 Wolfsmith v. March, 51 Cal. 2d 832, 337 P. 2d 70 (1959); Seneris v. Haas, 45 Cal.
2d 811, 291 P. 2d 915 (1955); and Bauer v. Otis, 133 Cal. App. 2d 439, 284 P. 2d 133
(1955).
13 LeMere v. Goren, 43 Cal. Rptr. 898 (1965).
14 Hundemere v. Sisters of Charity of Cincinnati, Inc., 22 Ohio App. 2d 119, 258 N.E.
2d 611 (1969).
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involving an injection of the drug Levophed. The plaintiff sought to
introduce the testimony of a former Army nurse who was a resident of
New York City and who gave her testimony by way of deposition. Miss
Aynes, the expert witness, had gained her. knowledge of the drug by
reading the instructions on a newly purchased package of that drug.1"
She had had no experience with the intravenous infusion of Levophed,
nor did she have specific knowledge of the standard of care and treat-
ment in the Cincinnati area. The court held that: (1) the rule of res
ipsa loquitur did not apply, (2) expert testimony is necessary to es-
tablish the negligent injection of a drug, and (3) a plaintiff seeking
recovery for the negligent intravenous infusion of a drug must establish
the standard of care exercised by hospitals, doctors and nurses in the
community.
A contrary opinion had been issued by the Ohio Supreme Court
in Jones v. Hawks Hospital of Mount Carmel in 1964. But in that case
the subject of inquiry was found to be within the common, ordinary
knowledge and experience of mankind. The plaintiff, in an advanced
stage of labor, had been restless since being admitted to the hospital and
had attempted several times to climb over the guard rails. The nurse
left the ward for a period of from one to five minutes on an unrelated
matter. During her absence the plaintiff fell from the bed sustaining
injuries (some of them permanent).16
Matters which can be decided from ordinary and common expe-
rience may be decided by the jury.17 However, the Ohio Supreme
Court in Oberlin v. Friedman, held that no presumption of negligence
results from the mere fact of injury nor from the unsuccessful results
of surgery, but rather the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to show
the negligence of the defendant and that such negligence was the proxi-
mate cause of the plaintiff's injury.1 8
A more liberal approach to the problem of the conspiracy of silence
was taken in another Ohio case, Oleksiw v. Weidener,19 in which ques-
tions asked of the defendant required expert testimony by him. At
the trial objections to such questions were sustained by the court. Sec-
tion 2317.07 of the Ohio Revised Code provides that:
At the instance of the adverse party, a party may be cross examined
as if under cross examination like any other witness ...
The Supreme Court of Ohio, in explaining the purpose of Section
2317.07 of the Revised Code, indicated that a person has no right to
15 Id. at 123.
16 Jones v. Hawkes Hospital of Mt. Carmel, 175 Ohio St. 503, 196 N.E. 2d 592 (1964).
17 21 0. Jur. 2d 451.
18 5 Ohio St. 2d 1, 213 N.E. 2d 168 (1965); Siverson v. Weber, 22 Cal. Rptr. 337, 372
P. 2d 97 (1962).
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remain silent in a judicial proceeding, since the withholding of rele-
vant testimony obstructs the administration of justice. A civil defendant
does not enjoy the same privilege against self incrimination that a
criminal defendant enjoys. Both California and New York have allowed
similar questioning of the defendant as an expert witness.2
0
Other Jurisdictions
Malpractice actions resulting from injections of the drug Levophed
are quite common and the law in other jurisdictions regarding the
necessity of medical expert testimony is similar to that in Ohio.2
1
In Grantham v. Goetz, a Pennsylvania case, the plaintiff suffered
a severe chemical burn on his leg as a result of the extravasation 22
of a drug administered intravenously while he was being treated for
shock. He was nonsuited at the trial. He appealed charging that the
defendant was negligent in not providing the standard of care necessary
under the circumstances. Although the plaintiff was able to offer ex-
pert medical testimony, that "constant attention" was required under
the circumstances, he was unable to produce evidence that the de-
fendant had not exercised the degree of care required of reasonable
men in like circumstances. 2 3 In fact, the only expert testimony offered
by the plaintiff tended to refute the very proposition that it was elicit-
ing-that the standard of care in that community had not been met
by the defendants.
In a New Jersey case, Renrick v. City of Newark, the same drug
(Levophed) infiltrated the tissue surrounding the veins and surgery
was required to repair the damages caused by the drug.24 Here, how-
ever, plaintiff offered no expert medical testimony and requested that
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur be invoked relying on Toy v. Rickert. 25
The fact situation in that case, however, varied from the case in ques-
tion in that the issue was whether a needle had been injected in an un-
orthodox manner and at an unorthodox site. The New Jersey Superior
Court sustained the trial court's dismissal holding that the infiltration
of the drug into the tissues did not permit a finding of negligence absent
expert testimony.
An Illinois case, Graham v. St. Lukes Hospital,20 aptly illustrates
20 Lawless v. Calaway, 24 Cal. 2d 81, 147 P. 2d 604 (1944); McDermott v. Manhattan
Eye, Ear and Throat Hosp., 15 N.Y. 2d 20, 255 N.Y.S. 2d 65, 203 N.E. 2d 469, 474
(1964).
21 Hundemere v. Sisters of Charity of Cincinnati, Inc., supra n. 14.
22 Extravasation is the process of passing by infiltration as effusion from a proper
vessel or channel into the surrounding tissue.
23 401 Pa. 349, 164 A. 2d 225 (1960).
24 Renrick v. City of Newark, 74 N.J. Super. 200, 181 A. 2d 25 (1960).
25 53 N.J. Super. 27, 146 A. 2d 510 (App. Div. 1958).
26 46 Ill. App. 2d 147, 196 N.E. 2d 355 (1964).
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the results of the "conspiracy of silence" on a plaintiff's ability to present
expert medical testimony. The plaintiff was admitted to the hospital to
be operated on for a hysterectomy. The operation was successful, but
the plaintiff alleged that on the following day a nurse hurriedly entered
her room, lifted her pajama top and injected a hypodermic needle into
her back. She experienced excruciating pain and was tended to by
interns and two nurses. The next day she was examined by Dr. Ed-
wards who alluded to her mishap and prescribed hot packs. In the
years following the plaintiff suffered pain, physical deformity and re-
quired several operations to remedy the condition. During the trial
Dr. Edwards denied any knowledge of the injection or treatment for
back ailments. An insurance claim signed by Dr. Edwards describing
the site of the injection and its location was rejected as hearsay evidence
because the plaintiff had not established a basis for it. Also, the records
of the hospital referred only to the "site of the injection" with no descrip-
tion of where the site was located on the body. Although the court
admitted that "the burdens [sic of proof] which the plaintiff must
bear are difficult to meet," 27 it upheld the nonsuit because no prima
facie case of negligence had been established.
Certain types of medical testimony have not been accepted by the
courts. In a workmen's compensation action to recover for the loss of
a testicle and for other injuries, the plaintiff offered the testimony of a
chiropractor as to treatment for pain in his shoulders and neck. The
Louisiana Court refused to recognize chiropractors as experts in view of
the fact that they were not permitted to practice in Louisiana.2 8 Con-
testing the testimony of the chiropractor was an orthopedist who had
treated the plaintiff and had discovered pre-existing arthritis and found
evidence of cervical strain. He had discharged him as fully recovered
with no residual disability.
Court Answers To The Problem
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has been the most frequent sub-
stitute for medical expert testimony. This doctrine, however, has been
severely criticized, and has been poorly articulated by the courts. E.
Crawford Morris29 has suggested that the doctrine has been "per-
verted" by the courts into a "rule of sympathy" wherein the courts,
rather than turn an innocent patient out without compensation for in-
jury, have used the doctrine as a method of social legislation.30 Morris
27 Id. at 361.
28 Tuggles v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 228 S. 2d 671 (La., 1969).
29 Of the firm of Arter, Hadden, Wykoff and Van Duzer of Cleveland.
30 Speech by E. Crawford Morris delivered to Medical-Legal symposium of the
American Medical Association at San Francisco, Louisville, and New York in March
and April, 1961. The speech represented the first half of a debate (obviously the
defendant's half) on the use of the res ipsa doctrine in medical malpractice actions.
Jan. 1971
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alleges that the courts actually rely on two unrelated doctrines in the
law: (1) one under which a carrier (railroad) has to explain the accident
since it has superior knowledge (i.e., in effect switching the burden of
proof to defendant doctors); and (2) liability without fault which
amounts to a method of socialized spreading of the risk.
Criticism of the use of the doctrine of res ipsa is highly justified
in some areas. For example, where common knowledge of laymen
(jurors) has been permitted to determine whether a physician has been
negligent in cases where forceps are left inside the plaintiff.31 But these
vary from actual res ipsa cases because they involve prima facie cases
of negligence where omissions have been alleged and proven.
The principal effect of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is to switch
the burden of going forward with proof from the plaintiff to the de-
fendant, who usually tries to dispel the possible inference of negligence
by proffering evidence in explanation of the facts.32 The theory is that
the defendant has placed himself in a place of special responsibility to-
ward the plaintiff or public. A narrow and reasonable view has been
suggested by Professor Jaffe: "If a defendant has not taken the pains
to find out what lies in his power, or if he evades explanation at a
crucial point, or if his evidence suggests mendacity . . . [he] must sub-
mit to the jury or to a directed verdict." 33
Other expert testimony is available in the form of medical texts.
This is a limited avenue for the plaintiff. Usually the rule is that evi-
dence of the contents of the text is available only for the impeachment
of an adverse witness and then only if he acknowledges that the text
is authoritative. 34 In Stone v. Proctor, a North Carolina case in which
the plaintiff alleged negligence on the part of a physician in the admin-
istration of electroshock therapy, the court permitted the introduction
of a document entitled Standards for Electroshock Treatment. It had
been approved by the Council of the American Psychiatric Association
to establish the standards required in the administration of Electroshock
therapy to patients.3 5 The defendant acknowledged the authenticity and
applicability of the document to the area in which he practiced, and
this was sufficient to warrant its admission as evidence.36
Several states, including Nevada and Massachusetts, permit (by
statute) the use of treatises. 37 The introduction of treatises, however,
31 E.g., Swanson v. Hill, 166 F. Supp. 296 (D.N.P. 1958); Tiller v. Van Pohle, 72 Ariz.
11, 230 P. 2d 213 (1951).
32 Cho v. Kempler, 177 Cal. App. 2d 342, 2 Cal. Rptr. 167 (D. C. App. 1960).
33 Jaffe, Res Ipsa Loquitur Vindicated, 1 Buffalo L. Rev. 1 (1951).
34 7 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 485 (1960).
35 259 N.C. 633, 131 S.E. 2d 297 (1963).
36 32 C.J.S. Evidence 625.
37 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. Ch. 233, § 79C (1959); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 51.040 (1961).
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is frequently criticized as a violation of the hearsay rule because the
author is not available for cross examination.
Another method to prove the standard of care in the injection of
certain drugs is to introduce the instructions of the manufacturer of
the drug. The plaintiff in Hundemere,38 however was unsuccessful
in using such instructions to prove the standard of care required by
introducing them through his expert. The court held that the expert,
although familiar with the instructions of the manufacturer, was not
aware of the standard of care in the community.
In an action for wrongful death which occurred during the extraction
of teeth and in the administration of an anesthetic (sodium pentathol),
the Supreme Court of Idaho found that it was error to exclude from
evidence the instruction sheet of the drug manufacture:
The author was a third party in no wise interested in the outcome
of the litigation. It is a recognized pharmaceutical concern. It
bears the same liability for damages to users of this product that
manufacturers generally bear for negligence ... True it is not con-
clusive evidence . . .but it is prima facie proof of a proper method
of use .. .:9
The court remanded for a new trial on this and other grounds. This
method has found limited acceptance, however, and has not been per-
mitted as conclusive proof of the standard of care in a community to
date.
A less popular and less reliable method of eliciting expert medical
testimony is to use the defendant himself to prove the standard of care
in the community and to prove that he did not meet that standard.
States often provide, by statute, that an adverse party may be called
to the stand and be cross examined by the party calling him.
In Oleksiw v Weidener,40 the Supreme Court of Ohio held that
the expert testimony of the defendant could be elicited, relying upon
§ 2317.07 of the Ohio Revised Code which allows that an adverse witness
may be examined as if under cross examination.
The Supreme Court of California held similarly in the Lawless
case where a physician diagnosed an attack of appendicitis as acute
ptomaine poisoning. The court reversed the finding of the lower court
because it had limited the scope of examination of the defendant who
was called as an adverse witness under § 2055 of the California Code
of Civil Procedure. The statutes "were enacted to enable a party to
call his adversary and elicit his testimony without making him his wit-
38 Hundemere v. Sisters of Charity of Cincinnati, Inc., supra n. 14.
39 Julien v. Barker, 272 P. 2d 718 at 724 (1954).
40 Oleksiw v. Weidener, supra n. 19.
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ness . .They are remedial in character and should be liberally con-
strued in order to accomplish their purpose." 41
Finally, the Court of Appeals of New York, relying on Civil Pro-
cedure Laws & Rules, 4501, 4512, permitted the plaintiff in McDermott
to call the defendant doctor to the stand and to question him both as
to the facts and as an expert in order to establish the standard of care
prevailing in the community. 42
Using the defendant as an expert witness has several obvious short-
comings. Seldom is such a witness likely to strengthen the case of the
plaintiff and oftentimes his testimony will be more damaging than help-
ful.
Conclusion
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in malpractice actions serves a
very useful function, since the burden in effect is switched to the de-
fendant physician to dispel the possible inference of negligence. The
doctrine, however, has not been clearly enunciated by the courts and
has been invoked both when prima facie cases of negligence have been
asserted and proved 43 and when specific acts of negligence have been
proven.44 Use of the doctrine should be limited, and upon the proffering
of information by the defendant to dispel a possible inference, the tra-
ditional doctrine that he who asserts must prove should be enforced by
the courts.
Expanding the number of experts available to the plaintiff in order
to counter the conspiracy of silence would greatly alleviate his burden
in obtaining experts. The present requirement that the standard of care
in the community be established by expert testimony places a limita-
tion on the number of experts available to a plaintiff for two reasons.
First, there may well be personal involvement among physicians of
similar skills in the same area, and presumably they would be re-
luctant to testify against one another; and, second, pressure exerted
by the local medical association may effectively limit such testimony.4
5
Traditional limitations because of communication and transportation
have all but disappeared and it is not uncommon for physicians to refer
patients to practitioners in other localities, oftentimes hundreds of miles
away. This is especially true as the degree of specialty increases. Re-
laxation of the locality rule would thus serve to expand the number of
experts available to a plaintiff.
41 Lawless v. Calaway, supra n. 20 at 608.
42 McDermott v. Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hospital, supra n. 20.
43 Tiller v. Van Pohle, 72 Ariz. 11, 230 P. 2d 213 (1951).
44 Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Board of Trustees, 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 317 P. 2d 170
(Dist. Ct. App. 1957).
45 Berstein v. Alameda-Contra Costa Medical Association, supra n. 6.
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Several states have already taken steps to alleviate the burden on
the plaintiff by allowing the defendant's testimony to establish the
standard of care in a community, using procedural rules which permit
the cross examination of the defendant doctor.46 This is an acceptable
method, but its obvious shortcomings from the plaintiff's point of view
will probably limit its use.
Also, the use of medical texts has found some acceptance in the
courts and will enable the plaintiff to present expert testimony without
a physician testifying as to the standard of care in a community. 47
Adducing an admission that the text is authoritative requires skillful
examination of the defendant physician by the plaintiff's attorney, and
this fact is the primary limitation of this method.48
The most dangerous result which could occur, it seems, would be
the evolution of a rule of liability without fault. This would amount
to a socialized spreading of the risk, with the burden falling on society
(and therefore on the patient) rather than on the negligent or inept
physicians. The medical profession cannot, and should not, be a insurer
that every diagnosis and resultant treatment will be successful, for the
practice of medicine is not an exact science and often a treating physician
is selecting from among a number of acceptable persons or alternatives.
Finally, real self-policing of the medical profession is necessary, and
should be done by the local medical associations. Compliance with a
statement of the Judicial Council of the American Medical Association,
that "a physician should expose, without fear or favor, incompetent
or corrupt, dishonest or unethical conduct on the part of members of
the profession," will be the best answer to the outrageous medical con-
spiracy of silence. Although the greatest impact of such a conspiracy is
felt by an injured plaintiff, who is unable to find relief in the courts,
it also affects the medical profession itself in terms of increasing in-
surance costs, reaction by the public in favor of restrictions on the
effective practice of medicine, and the spectre of increasingly unclear
and burdensome legal doctrines.
46 Oleksiw v. Weidener, supra n. 19; Lawless v. Calaway, supra n. 20; and McDer-
mott v. Manhattan Eye, Ear and Throat Hosp., supra n. 20.
47 Stone v. Proctor, supra n. 35.
48 32 C.J.S. 625, supra n. 36.
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